We examine the degree and sources of disagreement between the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and the Federal Reserve's (Fed's) staff about the appropriate policy rate for the period 1987-2011. For that purpose, we compute a counterfactual interest rate for the Fed's staff, based on its own Greenbook forecasts and a Taylor (1993) rule, and compare it with the actual target rate. First, we find that the FOMC behaved more hawkish (dovish) during the 1990s (during the early 2000s) compared to the suggestions of the Fed's staff. Second, we reveal that a more experienced FOMC and a higher share of members with a background in finance, the government, or the Bank staff are associated with relatively more hawkish monetary policy. In addition, the FOMC is found to prefer tighter monetary policy under a Democratic President, if there is a clear majority in the Congress, and during times of high stock returns and low uncertainty. JEL Codes: E52; E58.
Introduction
"Almost all also indicated that the upside risks to their forecasts for economic growth had increased as a result of prospects for more expansionary fiscal policies in coming years. Many participants underscored the need to continue to weigh other risks and uncertainties attending the economic outlook. In that regard, several noted upside risks to U.S. economic activity from the potential for better-than-expected economic growth abroad or an acceleration of domestic business investment."
Minutes of the FOMC, December 13-14, 2016. 1 "The risks to the forecast for real GDP were seen as tilted to the downside, reflecting the staff's assessment that monetary policy appeared to be better positioned to offset large positive shocks than substantial adverse ones. In addition, the staff continued to see the risks to the forecast from developments abroad as skewed to the downside. Consistent with the downside risks to aggregate demand, the staff viewed the risks to its outlook for the unemployment rate as tilted to the upside."
Fed's staff forecasts from Minutes of the FOMC, December 13-14, 2016.
The meeting in December 2016 highlights disagreement between the Fed's staff and the monetary policymakers in the FOMC about future economic risks for the United States. Whereas the Fed's staff offer a pessimistic view of the economic outlook, the view of the FOMC members is more optimistic. Although the actual policy decision implemented at this meeting was free of dissent, with a rise of the federal funds target rate by 25 basis points to a range of 0.50% to 0.75%, internal disagreement between the FOMC and the Fed's staff can be observed in the minutes of this meeting. Romer and Romer (2008) emphasize that FOMC policymakers believe they have useful information to add to the staff's forecasts. This is evidenced by the economic "go-around" during each policy meeting where each member of the FOMC gives his or her own view of future economic conditions. This (additional) role played by FOMC policymakers in forecasting and predicting the consequences of policy actions might explain the internal disagreement observed between the Fed's staff the FOMC policymakers. However, even if many historical episodes, for instance, the policy meetings 1 Source: https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/fomcminutes20161214.pdf. of July 1979 2 and February 1991 3 , suggest such differences, previous literature about the FOMC's decision-making process mainly focuses on dissent within the FOMC in its interest rate decisions (see, among many others, Belden 1989; Gildea 1990; Havrilesky and Schweitzer 1990; Havrilesky and Gildea 1991) , voiced disagreement within the FOMC in its deliberations (see, for instance, Meade 2005; Meade 2010) , and voiced disagreement in speeches by FOMC members (Hayo and Neuenkirch 2013) . Thus far, little is known about disagreement between the FOMC and the Fed's staff.
We aim at filling this gap in the literature by examining the degree and sources of disagreement between the FOMC and the Fed's staff. For that purpose, we assume a situation where the Fed's staff hypothetically sets interest rates based on its own Greenbook forecasts and a Taylor (1993) rule. The Fed's staff implied interest rate (henceforth, FSIIR) reflects a counterfactual policy recommendation and allows us to compute an unobserved variable based on observed macroeconomic forecasts. Our sample contains 196 regularly scheduled interest rate decisions between August 1987 and December 2011. Hence, our sample also covers 24 decisions at the zero-lower bound (ZLB) of interest rates.
In a first step, we contrast the FSIIR to the actual target rate set by the FOMC. The comparison reveals that there are persistent differences between the actual target rate and the FSIIR, suggesting persistent internal disagreement about the appropriate policy rate. In particular, FOMC members behaved more hawkish during the 1990s and more dovish during the early 2000s when compared to the suggestions of the Fed's staff.
In a second step, we explain the differences between the actual target rate set by the FOMC and the FSIIR. The extant literature has identified four sources that explain heterogeneity in monetary policy preferences across FOMC members, which also might explain internal disagreement between the FOMC and the Fed's staff. The first source is related to the background characteristics of policymakers. Malmendier et al (2017) 2 "Although the staff forecast is a reasonable one, I find myself a little more pessimistic. I am concerned about both the likelihood of less real growth and more inflation." (Robert P. Mayo, FOMC Transcript, July 11, 1979, 20-21) .
3 "I actually don't quite agree with the Greenbook because I think the inflation forecast is too high. From what I can sense, looking at the internal price structure of a lot of companies and talking to a lot of people ... it may turn out to be doing better." (Alan Greenspan, FOMC Transcript, February 5-6, 1991, 49). find that personal experiences of inflation strongly influence the hawkish or dovish leanings of central bankers. Eichler and Lähner (2014) show that FOMC members with longer careers in government, industry, academia, non-governmental organizations, and on the staff of the Board of Governors are more focused on output stabilization. In contrast, FOMC members with longer careers in the financial sector, or on the staffs of regional Fed banks, are more focused on inflation stabilization.
The second source of heterogeneity is related to the regional background of FOMC members. Jung and Latsos (2015) find that regional variables help explain the interest rate preferences of most Bank presidents. Coibon and Goldstein (2012) show that the Fed sets interest rates partly in response to regional economic disparities. Additional evidence showing the influence of regional cycles on FOMC members' policy preferences is provided by Meade and Sheets (2005) and Chappell et al (2008) .
The third source of heterogeneity is related to the different economic forecasts used by the FOMC and the Fed's staff to set the policy rate. Romer and Romer (2008) show that the predictive ability of the staff's forecasts is substantially better than the FOMC's forecasts. Worse, they also find evidence that differences between both forecasts help predict monetary policy shocks, suggesting that policymakers act in part on the basis of their apparently misguided information. Subsequent papers have provided motives to explain these differences. Tillmann (2011) argues that there is strategic forecasting among FOMC members as non-voters systematically overpredict (underpredict) inflation if they favor tighter (looser) policy. Ellison and Sargent (2012) suggest that the FOMC uses forecasts based on a worst-case scenario to design its policy decisions. Our results reveal that a more experienced FOMC and a higher share of members with a background in finance, the government, or the Bank staff are associated with relatively more hawkish monetary policy. In addition, the FOMC is found to prefer tighter monetary policy (as compared to its staff) under a Democratic President, if there is a clear majority in the Congress, and during times of high stock returns and low uncertainty.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the counterfactual interest rate for the Fed's staff and compares it to the actual target rate set by the FOMC. Section 3 explains the econometric methodology and the data set. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
The Fed Staff's Implied Interest Rate
In a first step, we derive our counterfactual interest rate, that is, the FSIIR, against which we compare the actual interest rate set by the FOMC. Taylor (1993) proposed the following rule to describe the Fed's interest rate setting:
i t is the target rate, r the equilibrium real interest rate, π t the inflation rate, π * the "target value" for inflation, and y t the output gap, that is, the difference between actual output and potential output. Assuming a real interest rate of 2% and an "inflation target" of 2%, Eq. (1) can be re-written as follows:
The Fed's target rate should be equal to 1% plus 1.5 times the inflation rate, and 0.5 times the output gap. Empirically, we observe that central banks do not abruptly reset their target rate to the proposed Taylor interest rate. Rather, they gradually adjust it towards the new target in small steps (Clarida et al 1998) . Similarly, the Fed's staff, when hypothetically allowed to put forward its own interest rate, has to use the actual target rate of the previous meeting as the starting point. Accounting for this interest rate smoothing behavior leads to the following specification:
Eq.
(3) implies that 90% of the previous period's target rate carries over to the current period and that 10% is reset due to changes in the macroeconomic situation. In the following, we assume that the Fed's staff proposes an interest rate based on Eq.
(3).
It has to be noted that, while for convenience we make assumptions on the Taylor coefficients, we will relax these as part of our robustness tests.
As macroeconomic variables, we use the Fed staff's projections of inflation, the output gap, and the unemployment gap found in the Greenbook. rate (Wu and Xia 2016) , the latter is used for estimations that also take into account the period after 2008. 6 5 Note that the Greenbook and the Bluebook were combined into the Tealbook in June 2010. Since then, the relevant forecasts can be found in the Tealbook A. In the following, however, we stick to the more commonly known label "Greenbook." 6 Shadow rates provide a quantification of all unconventional monetary policy measures in a single interest rate and also allow for negative interest rates when the actual policy rate is at the ZLB. Since monetary policy is supposed to be forward-looking, our implied Taylor rules for the Fed's staff utilize the four-quarter ahead expected inflation rate E t π t+4 as a nominal macroeconomic indicator. As a real macroeconomic indicator, we use (i) output gap forecasts E t y t+4 , and (ii) unemployment gap forecasts E t u t+4 . The latter is included since the Fed's dual mandate focuses on employment as real macroeconomic indicator rather than on the output gap.
Preliminary estimations indicate that, while a weight of 0.5 is appropriate for the expected output gap, a weight of 1.0 is more reasonable for the expected unemploy-ment gap. 7 As mentioned before, we have to take into account the ZLB of interest rates in our calculations of implied interest rates. As a consequence, we estimate four different types of benchmark interest rates. Eqs. (4) and (5) use the lagged actual target rate (i t−1 ), the expected output gap and the expected unemployment gap, respectively.
Here, the sample ends in December 2008, when the FOMC cut its target rate to a range of 0% to 0.25%. Eqs. (6) and (7) repeat this exercise with the lagged shadow rate (i s t−1 )
for the full sample period (August 1987-December 2011):
c y t and c u t are the counterfactual interest rates based on the actual target rate, the expected output gap and the expected unemployment gap, respectively. c s,y t and c s,u t are the corresponding counterfactuals based on the shadow rate.
Next, we relate these counterfactual interest rates to the actual target rate (i t ) set by the FOMC and the shadow rate (i s t ). Consequently, we create four different indicators measuring the "bias" of the FOMC with the respect to the recommendation by the Fed's staff:
A positive (negative) value of the bias implies that the actual interest rate is higher (lower) than the recommendation by the Fed's staff. The left panel in Figure 2 shows the bias based on Eqs. (8) and (9). The right panel repeats this exercise for Eqs. (10) and (11). were behaving more hawkish (dovish) than the recommendations of the Fed's staff. Finally, it is worth noting that the implied target rate based on the unemployment gap is more in line with the shadow rate at the ZLB than the one based on the output gap.
Econometric Methodology
This section aims at explaining the sources of disagreement between the FOMC and the Fed's staff. Consequently, our four different dependent variables correspond to the FOMC's bias introduced in Eqs. (8)-(11). The general specification is as follows:
The vector X t contains five different types of explanatory variables. 8 First, we consider different weights in the Taylor rule as a reason for disagreement between the FOMC and the Fed's staff as we control for inflation forecasts in every estimation and switch between output gap forecasts and unemployment gap forecasts depending on the specific model. In addition, the financial and broader macroeconomic environment, in particular, macroeconomic uncertainty, might lead to a different assessment of preferred interest rates across these two bodies. Hence, we look at oil prices (in log differences) to account for the impact of supply shocks, the S&P 500 index (in log dif- 
Empirical Results
Tables 1-4 show the results for the determinants of the bias based on the output gap and the unemployment gap, respectively, and for the pre-crisis subsample and the full sample period, respectively. In the following, we interpret the FOMC's bias from the point of view of the monetary policymakers. This means that positive coefficients explain why the FOMC behaves more hawkish than proposed by the Fed staff's counterfactual interest rate and, vice versa. To conserve space, we focus on clear patterns 11 The reference category for (iv) and (v) is a split Congress. 12 State leading indexes are aggregated to the district level using population weights.
in the results, that is, we do not overemphasize findings where we detect just a single significant coefficient per explanatory variable.
The findings of the stepwise regressions indicate that macroeconomic and financial conditions constitute important determinants of disagreement between the FOMC and the Fed's staff. Higher macroeconomic uncertainty increases internal disagreement on the dovish side, whereas higher stock returns are associated with a hawkish bias during the pre-crisis period.
Next, we find that the personal and career characteristics of FOMC members are significant. A higher share of voting women in the FOMC is associated with a more hawkish bias. This might be explained by the fact that women tend, on average, to be more conservative in their monetary policy preferences, possibly in order to establish a reputation, as suggested by Farvaque et al (2014) . Furthermore, we observe a nonlinear effect pattern related to the average experience of FOMC members. The linear term indicates that committees with a low level of experience tend to disagree on the dovish side. However, this effect reaches its minimum after roughly five to six years of experience and increases thereafter, as indicated by the coefficients for the nonlinear term. As for professional experiences, a higher percentage share of members with a significant background in finance or the government are associated with more disagreement on the hawkish side, compared to the base category, that is, the share of members with experience in academia. The opposite is found for members with a background in the industry or on the Board staff.
When we focus on the political factors, there is a bias towards a hawkish monetary policy when a Democratic President holds the executive office and when Congress is controlled by Republicans. The tenure of Chairman Bernanke and a higher percentage share of governors that were appointed by a Democratic President, however, are associated with a bias towards a dovish monetary policy. The latter finding, in combination with the finding that the FOMC tends to disagree on the hawkish side under a Democratic President, illustrates once again that it is important to distinguish between a political influence via the appointment of governors and an influence via political pressure at the time of the decision. Newey/West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
As for the regional variables, a higher standard deviation of the district-specific unemployment rates (leading indexes), that is, larger disparities within the United States, leads to an increase (decrease) in the FOMC's hawkish bias. This result is in line with previous studies that find regional conditions to have a significant impact on FOMC members' monetary policy preferences (Meade and Sheets 2005; Chappell et al 2008; Coibon and Goldstein 2012; Jung and Latsos 2015) .
When we include all of the variables in a single model, the findings are broadly in line with those of the stepwise regressions. However, some of the estimates become insignificant in the nested specifications. Hence, our key results-that are robust to potential collinearity issues-are that a more experienced FOMC and a higher share of members with a background in finance, the government, or the Bank staff are associated with relatively more hawkish monetary policy. In addition, the FOMC is found to prefer tighter monetary policy (as compared to its staff) under a Democratic President, if there is a clear majority in the Congress, and during times of high stock returns and low uncertainty.
Finally, as a robustness test, we use the coefficients of the estimated Taylor rule in Table A1 and extract the residuals. We then explain the residuals with the same variables as in Eq. (12). The results in Table A3 indicate that our findings are robust with respect to the macroeconomic variables, the career characteristics of FOMC member, and the political factors.
Conclusions
This paper examines the degree and sources of internal disagreement between the FOMC and the Fed's staff about setting the appropriate policy rate. For that purpose, we assume that the Fed's staff hypothetically sets interest rates based on its own Greenbook forecasts and a Taylor (1993) Newey/West (1987) standard errors are in parentheses. Number of observations: 171 (pre-crisis period) and 195 (full sample), respectively. ***/**/* indicate significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
